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Abstract. This paper concerns the political economy of budget balances and focuses on ﬁscal referen-
dums. It speciﬁcally suggests – on the basis of theoretical arguments – that any analysis of ﬁscal refer-
endums must take their spending thresholds into account. Thus, it claims that mandatory ﬁscal
referendums can impose greater constraints than optional ﬁscal referendums. In conclusion, various
recommendations based on this observation are proposed.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, there have been remarkable developments in the area of the political
economy of budget balances. These can be explained both by the desire to under-
stand how the ﬁnancial situation (ﬁnancial balances, debt etc.) of public authorities
evolves, and by the need to counter problems in the area of budgetary control, in
particular, the increasing share of budgets accounted for by passive interest and the
resulting loss of room for manoeuvre caused by an accumulation of deﬁcits.3
Since the 1990s, this theoretical ﬁeld has been developed by commentators
paying particular attention to the role of institutions in determining public bal-
ances (deﬁcits or surpluses). This focus is the result of recent advances in theory,4
the introduction of convergence criteria by the European Union (Poterba and von
Hagen 1999: 1–2), and empirical research demonstrating that economic and
structural dimensions (demographic, geographical etc.) alone cannot provide a
complete explanation for the recent ﬁnancial growth of the OECD countries
(Alesina and Perotti 1995: 2).
Consequently, it is important to take institutional factors into account when
discussing the preventive or corrective measures needed to deal with an exces-
sively high level of debt.5 The evaluation of measures previously undertaken must
take institutional design into account: one and the same measure can have dif-
ferent eﬀects depending on a public authority’s institutional arrangement. Fur-
thermore, this facilitates the evaluation of the impact of the institutional
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instruments themselves (do they inﬂuence balances and by how much etc.).6 The
knowledge of their impact makes it possible to evaluate fully the eﬀectiveness of
such institutions as instruments of ﬁscal control.
The institutions most studied include the normative rules concerning various
aspects of ﬁscal policy (expenditure, balance etc.) and ﬁscal referendums.7 This paper
focuses on the latter and, using theoretical arguments, demonstrates that in order to
analyze (or take into account) the inﬂuence of a community’s plebiscitary tool, it is
necessary to take both the spending threshold and eﬀort involved in the launch of
ﬁscal referendums into account.
The paper uses the traditional explanations of the inﬂuence of ﬁscal referendums
from the literature in support of this argument (Section 2). Speciﬁcally, it explains
ﬁrstly why ﬁscal referendums have such an inﬂuence. It then goes on to explain why
mandatory ﬁscal referendums can exercise greater constraints than optional ﬁscal
referendums.
While the comments on referendums conclude at that point, it continues (Section 3)
by showing that optional referendums can be more restrictive than mandatory ref-
erendums if their spending thresholds are taken into account.
The ﬁnal section summarizes the main points of the paper and concludes by
proposing various recommendations based on the presented ﬁndings.
2. Fiscal Referendums
2.1. Characteristics of Fiscal Referendums
Fiscal referendums are instruments of direct democracy that allow citizens to
approve or reject new projects which have ﬁscal consequences for them as taxpayers.
In fact, when certain conditions are met, such referendums can result in the imple-
mentation of a project being made subject to its acceptance by the people. These
conditions depend on the existence of speciﬁc characteristics.
For the most part, these characteristics are either mandatory or optional and
concern single or periodical expenditure. The diﬀerent types of ﬁscal referendum are
presented in Figure 1.
A referendum becomes mandatory in cases in which the proposed spending on
a given project exceeds a deﬁned amount, which can vary from one public
authority to another or from one period to another (for the same public
authority). This limit can be ﬁxed for single expenditure or periodical expendi-
ture. Thus, there are single mandatory referendums and periodical mandatory
referendums. The latter are distinguished from each other by the duration of the
period considered.
Optional referendums (single or periodical) also concern spending proposals that
exceed a certain limit. The diﬀerence here is that citizens can only initiate optional
referendums if they succeed in collecting a certain number of signatures from their
peers in the course of a deﬁned period of time.
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Before going any further, it makes sense to present the mechanism by which ﬁscal
referendums inﬂuence public choices. This mechanism is the same for each of the
types of referendum under examination.
2.2. How do Referendums Inﬂuence the Decision-making Process?
The answer to this question depends on the possibility of the public decision-making
process leading to proposals that diﬀer from the hypothetical median voter’s choice.
Indeed, if such a possibility did not exist, all of the projects resulting from the
political-administrative process would correspond to the median voter’s wishes and
no project would ever be refused.8 However, in reality, some projects are refused as a
direct result of ﬁscal referendums. In fact, by giving the voters a right of veto on
certain spending proposals (Kriesi 1995: 88), ﬁscal referendums inﬂuence public
decision-making in two substantial ways:9
(1) ﬁrst, through the refusal of projects involving a level of expenditure that exceeds
what the voters are willing to pay. Voters can be expected to refer to the spending
thresholds of ﬁscal referendums when evaluating the projects that are submitted
to them.10 Consequently, it is possible that the probability of a project being
considered excessive will diﬀer according to whether it has been subject to a ﬁscal
referendum or not. Thus, if the costs associated with a project are higher than the
spending threshold, the probability that it will be considered excessive will be
higher in a public authority where a referendum is held. On the other hand, if the
costs are lower the probability should also be lower;
(2) the second factor is the self-restraint of the actors involved in the decision-
making process: project initiators internalize the constraint represented by ﬁscal
referendums and moderate their proposals so that they will either not be subject
Fiscal
referendums
Optional
Spending threshold
Number of signatures required
Lapse of timeSingle
Spending threshold
Number of signatures required
Periodical Lapse of time
Mandatory
Single
Periodical Spending threshold
Spending threshold
Figure 1. Characteristics of ﬁscal referendums.
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to a referendum or, if they are, that they will not be considered too excessive and
rejected.11
2.3. Illustration of the Inﬂuence of the Fiscal Referendums
The horizontal axis locates the costs associated with the proposed projects; the
further to the right a project is located, the higher its associated costs. The point ‘‘S’’
indicates the status quo.12 The point ‘‘MV’’ locates the costs associated with what
would be the median voter’s optimal choice.13 In this situation, the median voter
prefers any project associated with the segment ‘‘a’’ instead of the status quo (de-
noted as ‘‘S’’): the points of this segment correspond to solutions, that are closer to
his ideal solution than ‘‘S’’. At the point ‘‘I’’, the median voter is indiﬀerent between
the status quo and the project corresponding to it. In other words, point ‘‘I’’ cor-
responds to the maximum spending proposal that the median voter will approve.
From this point on, the status quo is preferred by the median voter over all new
proposals (starting from ‘‘I’’, the higher utility yielded by the new project does not
compensate for its cost). As a result, the median voter prefers any point of the
segment ‘‘b’’ instead of point ‘‘S’’.14 On that basis, we must consider the position
occupied by the proposal resulting from the public decision-making process. If ‘‘P’’ is
on the right-hand side of ‘‘I’’, the project would be refused in the case of ﬁscal
referendums. If it is on its left-hand side, it would be approved. Thus, ﬁscal refer-
endums would have an observable impact (refusal of a project) only if the public
decision-making process leads to a proposal considered to be excessive by the voters
(on the right side of ‘‘b’’).15 If this were not the case, it would be wrong to conclude
that ﬁscal referendums do not exert an inﬂuence; it is possible that the referendum
triggered an eﬀect at an earlier stage (that was not directly observed) by limiting the
claims to the level of the decision-making process (thus restricting the project to the
segment ‘‘a’’ or ‘‘b’’).16
2.4. Comparative Illustration of the Inﬂuence of Mandatory and Optional Fiscal
Referendums
Figure 3 presents an initial comparison between the potential constraint exercised by
mandatory ﬁscal referendums and optional ﬁscal referendums. It is identical to the
Costs
S VM I P
a b
0
Figure 2. Mechanism of the ﬁscal referendum. (Feld and Matsusaka, 2000).
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preceding ﬁgure with a few exceptions: ‘‘Im’’, the point of indiﬀerence in the event of
a mandatory referendum, plays the role previously played by ‘‘I’’, and a point ‘‘Io’’
appears. This corresponds to the threshold of indiﬀerence in the event of an optional
referendum and a segment ‘‘c’’ connecting ‘‘Im’’ and ‘‘Io’’ can be traced. Further-
more, this time ‘‘S’’ is placed at the origin of the costs axis.17
This ﬁgure is generally used – with no explicit mention of the underlying
assumption on which it based – to show that optional referendums are less restrictive
than mandatory referendums. However, this assertion is only true if it is assumed
that their spending thresholds are not higher than ‘‘Im’’ (a discussion of this
assumption, which constitutes the core of this paper, is advanced later on).
Everything else being equal, optional referendums impose fewer constraints than
mandatory referendums because of the opportunity costs involved in the collection
of the signatures necessary to initiate an optional referendum.18 In fact, as this cost
enters into the calculation of the voters, it appears as a new category of project for
which the disutility generated by the spread to the optimal solution is lower than that
generated by the collection of the signatures (these are the projects associated with
the segment ‘‘c’’).19
Consequently if ‘‘P’’ had been located in segment ‘‘c’’, the proposal would have
been rejected in the context of a mandatory referendum. In fact, its potential
opponents would conclude that it was not worth the eﬀort of initiating an optional
referendum and the proposal would have been accepted: i.e. the potential opponents
would judge the cost of the status quo (in terms of a variation to their preferred
solution) lower than that of collecting the necessary signatures.20
3. The Importance of Taking Spending Thresholds into Account
3.1. Importance of the Spending Threshold When Comparing Referendums of the
Same Type21
To illustrate the role of the spending threshold, it is suﬃcient to take another look at
Figure 2 and discuss the limit position on the axis. This is precisely what Figure 4
Costs
S VM Im P
a b c
Io
Figure 3. Comparison of mandatory ﬁscal referendums and optional referendums. (Feld and Matsusaka,
2000).
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does. ‘‘L’’ corresponds to the limit sum from which the ﬁscal referendum starts:
projects whose associated costs are lower than this limit are not subject to the
referendum and the others are.22 Consequently:
 if the limit (‘‘L1’’ on the ﬁgure) were on the left of ‘‘I’’, all proposals implying a
cost lower than ‘‘I’’, but higher than ‘‘L1’’ would be subject to a referendum and
approved by the people. All those whose cost would be higher than ‘‘I’’ would be
rejected by a ﬁscal referendum;
 if the limit (‘‘L2’’ on the ﬁgure) were on the right of ‘‘I’’, all proposals lying
between ‘‘I’’ and ‘‘L2’’ can be imposed although they would have been rejected by
citizens (if they had expressed themselves). This diﬀerence is explained by the
internalization of the cost of collecting the signatures needed to initiate the
optional referendum.
These few lines demonstrate that the lower the spending threshold of a referendum,
the greater the potential constraint it can exercise.23 They also show that: the higher
the spending threshold of a referendum, the weaker the potential constraint it can
exercise.24
This point can also be demonstrated by reversing the logic of Figure 4 (that is to
say the discussion of the possible outcomes for a speciﬁc project) and to discuss what
might happen to projects from diﬀerent areas operating within a given limit (as is the
case in Figure 5).
This ﬁgure takes two areas of public intervention (domain A and domain B) into
consideration. The status quo, the costs associated with the median voter’s optimal
choice and the point of indiﬀerence are reciprocally: ‘‘SA’’, ‘‘SB’’, ‘‘MVA’’, ‘‘MVB’’,
‘‘IA’’ and ‘‘IB’’.25 In the case of domain A, the referendum could allow the voters to
Costs
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P
a b
L
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Figure 4. Inﬂuences of the spending threshold of a ﬁscal referendum I.
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refuse all of the proposed projects involving costs higher than ‘‘IA’’, whereas, in
domain B, voters could express their opposition starting only from ‘‘L’’. Thus, voters
could not be opposed to proposals whose costs lie between ‘‘IB’’ and ‘‘L’’, whereas if
they had been in a position to express themselves, they would have opposed it.
3.2. The Signiﬁcance of the Spending Threshold When Comparing Mandatory
Referendums and Optional Referendums
Figure 6 adapts the elements of Figure 3 to illustrate the case of a public authority that
holds a mandatory referendum and an optional referendum.26 As well as demon-
strating the importance of taking spending thresholds into account, it shows that
optional referendums can involve greater constraints than mandatory referendums.
‘‘Lm’’ indicates the limit sum for the start of the mandatory referendum and ‘‘Lo’’
that for the optional referendum. In a public authority that has two types of refer-
endum, ‘‘Lo’’ is always on the left of ‘‘Lm’’. If this were not the case, there would be
no reason to hold an optional referendum, since the projects which would be likely to
be subject to it would have already been subject to a mandatory referendum.27
Before discussing the possible outcomes, let us remember that all proposals
involving costs higher than ‘‘Im’’ in the event of a mandatory referendum would be
Costs
SA VMA IA
L
Costs
SB VMB IB
Figure 5. Inﬂuences of the spending threshold of a ﬁscal referendum II.
Costs
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P
Figure 6. The case of a public authority having mandatory and optional ﬁscal referendums.
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refused and, in the case of an optional referendum, all those involving costs higher
than ‘‘Io’’ would also be refused.28
Thus:
 all proposals associated with costs higher than ‘‘Lm’’ would be rejected, whatever
the form of the referendum taking place (i.e. mandatory or optional);
 those projects whose costs are higher than ‘‘Io’’ and lower than ‘‘Lm’’ are im-
posed, although the median voter would have rejected them if he had been able to
vote;
 proposals whose costs are lower than ‘‘Im’’ would be passed without any diﬃculty,
since the voters would prefer them to the status quo. Thus, each time ‘‘Lm’’ is
lower than ‘‘Im’’, a mandatory referendum is initiated and the public authority
bears an unnecessary ﬁscal cost: it must organize a ﬁscal referendum, although the
project will be accepted. In addition to this organizational cost, the unnecessary
referendum could lead to harmful delays in the implementation of the project.
Although other situations are possible (it would be necessary to discuss these in
relation to the position of ‘‘MV’’), it is possible to conﬁrm here that the level of
constraint imposed by an optional ﬁscal referendum is greater than that imposed by
a mandatory ﬁscal referendum whenever ‘‘Lm’’ is greater than ‘‘Io’’ and ‘‘Lo’’ is less
than or equal to ‘‘Io’’.29
4. Conclusion
This paper analyses ﬁscal referendums. More precisely, it stresses – using theoretical
arguments – the importance of taking the spending thresholds for ﬁscal referendums
into account. However, it does not imply that this dimension alone must be con-
sidered. In fact, it shows that it is necessary to take into account both the spending
threshold and the eﬀort involved in the collection of the signatures for the launch of
a ﬁscal referendum.
As a result, it shows that optional referendums may be more restrictive than
mandatory referendums, and that there is a certain continuity, or, to be more precise,
an overlap between the constraint imposed by mandatory ﬁscal referendums and
that imposed by optional ﬁscal referendums.
Thus, the analysis of the inﬂuence of a community’s plebiscitary tool is a rather
tricky exercise. It requires the identiﬁcation of a method that makes it possible to
verify all of the following requirements:
 ceteris paribus, a ﬁscal referendum with a lower spending threshold must be re-
garded as more restrictive than other ﬁscal referendums whose spending thresh-
olds are higher;
 likewise, the greater the eﬀort required to launch a ﬁscal referendum (or collect the
required number of signatures), the more restrictive it will be.
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 the existence of a form of ‘‘cumulative coherence’’ must also be acknowledged.
With the same spending thresholds, a single ﬁscal referendum accompanied by a
periodical one imposes more constraints than a single ﬁscal referendum. In the
same way, with equal limits, a mandatory referendum accompanied by an optional
referendum should impose more constraints than a mandatory referendum on its
own;30
 ﬁnally, the selected method must also take account of the fact that mandatory
ﬁscal referendums may be more restrictive than obligatory ones.
Of course, the quest for a method of this kind is only rendered necessary if the
argumentation presented in this paper is deemed valid. Thus, in the absence of any
arguments for is rejection or signiﬁcant alteration, it is necessary to ﬁnd a method
that makes it possible to take both the spending threshold and the eﬀort involved in
the launch of a ﬁscal referendum into account. Thus, the conclusions of studies that
do not do this must be relativized, unless they use methods other than those utilizing
one or more variables to measure the potential constraint of ﬁscal referendums.
Furthermore, assuming that the ﬁndings of this paper are correct, it is possible to
make two recommendations to public authorities. On the one hand, they ought not to
deﬁne the spending thresholds for their mandatory referendums at a too low level. In
fact, the lower the spending threshold of a ﬁscal referendum, themore participative the
public decision-making process (more people have the opportunity to express their
opinion), however the lower it is, the more likely it is that amandatory referendumwill
be initiated unnecessarily (for a project thatwould have been accepted). Such outcomes
constitute a waste of resources (cost of organization etc.) and hamper the public
decision-making process. On the other hand, public authorities allow themselves op-
tional ﬁscal referendums so as to regain a share of the democratic legitimacy they lose
by deﬁning a relatively high limit for mandatory referendums.
Notes
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This research was carried out within the framework of the project ‘‘Analysing the relationship between
revenue and expenditure: impact on budgetary balance and econometric modelisation’’ (12-67064.01)
ﬁnanced by the Swiss National Science Foundation.
3. OECD countries have endured repeated deﬁcits since the 1970s. This gave rise to signiﬁcant increases in
their national debt and in the share of their budgets accounted for by passive interest (Tanzi and
Schuknecht 2000).
4. For a long time, budget rules and institutions were considered as factors that did not aﬀect ﬁscal
outcomes (Poterba 1996: 395). Currently, authors (for example, von Hagen and Harden 1994: 341)
consider that institutional design can shape the outcome of budgeting decisions.
5. The notion of excessive debt is not theoretically well deﬁned. Shaviro (1997) and Novaresi (2001)
present the various arguments advanced in the debate for and against ﬁscal discipline. It emerges from
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these studies that the management of debt is not merely a matter of ﬁghting deﬁcits. Consequently, we
should not evaluate budgetary measures by this dimension alone.
6. Poterba (1997), Alesina and Perotti (1999) and Kirchga¨ssner (2002) review the empirical studies of the
impact of institutional factors.
7. Among the studies that deal with the inﬂuence of ﬁscal referendums, the following are particularly
worthy of note: Bohn and Inman (1996), Kiewiet and Szakaly (1996) and Bails and Tieslau (2000) for
the USA, and Stutzer and Frey (2001), Feld and Kirchga¨ssner (2001) and Feld and Matsusaka (2003)
for Switzerland.
8. This would be the case in a world that can be explained by the theory of the median voter (Feld and
Matsusaka 2003: 2721).
9. They also have a cosmetic inﬂuence to the extent that the actors involved in the decision-making
process may try to avoid the constraint of the ﬁscal referendum by splitting projects up and thus
keeping the project costs below the threshold deﬁned for the launch of a ﬁscal referendum.
10. According to Bowles (1998: 75), a stable institutional framework can play a role in inﬂuencing the
preferences of citizens.
11. This eﬀect is not (very) observable, because it is spread upstream of the decision-making process.
12. As ﬁscal referendums relate to new spending proposals only, there is no reason for including this
point. Consequently, the status quo corresponds in such situations to zero expenditure (i.e. at the
origin of the axis). The usual ﬁgure does not place ‘‘S’’ at the origin, this is why it is also the same
on this ﬁrst ﬁgure. However, this is no longer the case in the subsequent ones. Until we come to the
next ﬁgure, it is necessary to keep in mind that cases for which ‘‘MV’’ would be on the left of ‘‘S’’
do not exist.
If a ﬁscal referendum did not only concern new proposals, proposals located on the left of ‘‘S’’ would be
rejected. Thus ﬁscal referendums could restrict deviations from median voter preferences that lead to
too little spending as popular initiatives do (Matsusaka 2000).
13. Insofar as all individuals do not vote, this point does not correspond to that which would be chosen by
a benevolent dictator (or planner) who might wish to maximize the collective well-being by taking the
utility of each citizen into account.
14. In this paper, the length of ‘‘a’’ is considered equal to the length of ‘‘b’’. Nevertheless, the median voter
model assumes continuity and unimodality, but not symmetry of the voter’s preferences (Drazen 2000),
thus those lengths can be diﬀerent according to the spread of the voter’s preferences.
15. The Public Choice school would explain this in terms of the interaction of interests groups (Holcombe
1985: 130) and by that of the bureaucrats (Niskanen 1971). In fact, the latter constitute nothing more
than a particular interest group.
16. Kriesi (1995: 89) argues, for example, that the presence of instruments of direct democracy in
Switzerland played a signiﬁcant role in the structuring of the decision-making processes. In fact, the
inﬂuence of these instruments could be observed indirectly by measuring the importance of pre-par-
liamentary consultation phases. Sciarini et al. (2002) adopted this type of approach.
17. As mentioned in endnote 10, the status quo must be placed at the origin of the costs axis, because ﬁscal
referendums concern only new projects.
18. There can be no doubt that this opportunity cost would be an increasing function of the absolute
number and the relative number (compared to the number of potential voters) of signatures necessary
to launch optional referendums. Similarly, it would be a decreasing function of the importance of the
time available to collect the required signatures.
19. The number of signatures required for the launch of mandatory referendums being zero, this eﬀort is
zero for the latter.
20. It should be noted that under some circumstances, the case of the optional referendum almost comes
down to that of a mandatory referendum. Indeed, it could arise that an interest group was so opposed
to a project that the opportunity cost of collecting the signatures would appear relatively low (com-
pared to the spread of its preferred solution) and the group would go ahead and initiate an optional
referendum. In this case, the cost of collecting the signatures would almost not be internalized by the
voters and ‘‘Io’’ would be close to ‘‘Im’’.
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21. This means comparisons between mandatory referendums or between optional referendums. To switch
from one case to the other, it is suﬃcient to consider that ‘‘I’’ represents ‘‘Im’’ and ‘‘Io’’ respectively.
22. Although it does not aﬀect the understanding of the subject, it may be noted that this relates to a
mandatory referendum.
23. It is even possible to assert that this constraint would be maximal if all new proposals were be subject to
a mandatory referendum (which would be equivalent to a situation wherby the spending threshold is
zero).
24. Thus, it would not be excessive to suggest that from a spending threshold of a certain level, the ﬁscal
referendum will not be any more eﬀective or, at least, that its inﬂuence would be merely slight.
25. It could also be that ‘‘MV’’ is located on the right of ‘‘L’’. This would not alter the logic of the
explanation.
26. These results hold true even for political authorities that do not have both mandatory referendums and
optional referendums.
27. From a practical point of view, the limit sum for the optional referendum is often considerably lower
than that for the mandatory referendum. For example, in 1980, in Swiss cantons that had two types of
referendum, the spending thresholds of the optional referendum were on average seven times lower
than the spending thresholds of the mandatory referendum (this represented a ratio of 2 for the lowest
and of 25 for the highest).
28. As stated previously, when groups particularly opposed to a project initiate optional referendums, it is
possible that ‘‘IO’’ is close to ‘‘Im’’.
29. Or every time that the spending threshold of an optional ﬁscal referendum is lower than that of a
mandatory ﬁscal referendum and the eﬀort necessary for its launch does not compensate for the
diﬀerence between their spending thresholds.
30. It should be noted that this cumulative reinforcing eﬀect is not applicable for communities in which all
new spending is automatically subject to a ﬁscal referendum (or for communities with a mandatory
referendum whose spending threshold would be zero), as in this case the constraint exercised would be
already maximal.
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